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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Appellant, Mrs. Menz, appealed from the lower Court's "Order Amending
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce" (hereinafter, "Order
Amending") on the sole issue of whether the lower Court erred in awarding the
Appellee/Cross-Appellant, Mr. Menz, the sum of $76,781 in the Fidelity Investment
Account as his separate property rather dividing it equally as marital property.
Appellee/Cross-Appellant, Mr. Menz, appealed all orders signed by Judge Dever.
Mrs. Menz submitted her "Brief of Appellant"(herinafter, "Appellant's Brief).
Appellee submitted his "Brief of Cross-Appellant" (hereinafter, "Appellee's Brief)
in which he responded to Appellant's brief and asserted his arguments in support of
his Cross-Appeal. Mrs. Menz shall respond to the arguments of Mr. Menz in support
of his Cross-Appeal in Part I herein and shall reply to Mr. Menz' response to Mrs.
Menz' brief in Part II herein.
ARGUMENT
PART I: RESPONSE TO MR. MENZ ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF HIS
CROSS-APPEAL.
Virtually all of Mr. Menz in support of his Cross-Appeal hinges on his
assertion that Judge Thorne had signed Mr. Menz' proposedfindingsand conclusions
and his proposed decree of divorce (hereinafter "Thome's Findings and Decree")
2

prior to Judge Dever signing findings and conclusions and a decree of divorce. As
a result, Mr. Menz asserts (1) that the "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
the Decree of Divorce, signed January 16, 2001 (hereinafter collectively "Dever's
Findings and Decree) (R. 1184 and R. 1248) and Judge Dever's subsequent Order
Amending (R. 1297) constituted two amendments to the Thorne Findings and Decree
and the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do not permit two amendments; (2) that Judge
Dever, in his Order Amending, did not have the authority to change the allocation of
property that Judge Thorne had made in his ruling (See transcript of ruling at R.
1348); alternatively Mr. Menz clains that it was an abuse of discretion for Judge
Dever to do so; and (3) that Rule 59(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure require
the judge to grant or deny a new trial and do not permit just "amendment"; (4) that
Judge Dever was required to make findings explaining and supporting his changes
to the Dever Findings and Decree and failed to do so; and (5) that Judge Dever erred
in awarding each party his/her inherited sums as their separate property.
As set forth below, Mrs. Menz will demonstrate that each of Mr. Menz'
arguments are without merit, that Mr. Menz has made misleading statements to this
Court and has deliberately distorted the facts and the law. As a result, this Court
should deny Mr. Menz' Appeal and award Mrs. Menz attorney fees and costs for this
appeal.
3

POINT I
THERE IS ONLY ONE SET OF FINDINGS
AND DECREE, THOSE SIGNED BY JUDGE
DEVER, AND MRS. MENZ DID NOT AMEND
THE FINDINGS AND DECREE TWICE
Mr. Menz keeps beating a dead horse. The question of whether there were two
sets offindingsand decrees was resolved months ago as a result of the Joint Motion
of the parties. The sequence of events and the pertinent documents are set forth in the
parties' Joint Motion for Correction or Modification of Record and for Leave to
Amend on file with this Court (hereinafter "Joint Motion"). A copy of the Joint
Motion is attached hereto as Addendum No. 1.
The following is a brief summarization of the essence of the Joint Motion:
Judge Thorne, who had tried the case in February, 2000 resigned shortly thereafter
and Judge Dever was assigned to the case; the parties and Judge Dever all were under
the assumption that Mr. Menz' proposedfindingsand decree to which Mrs. Menz had
filed an objection were still pending when Judge Thorne resigned; Judge Dever
proceeded to rule on Mrs. Menz' objections and ultimately signed the Dever Findings
and Decree on January 16, 2001 (See Addendum No. 3 to Appellant's Brief); the
parties subsequently discovered that on June 30,2000, Judge Thorne had signed the
original proposed findings and conclusions which Mr. Menz had prepared and
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submitted and to which Mrs. Menz had filed objections. Thus, it appeared there
were two sets of Findings and Conclusions and two Decrees of Divorce signed by the
two different Judges, Judge Dever and Judge Thorne. (See Add. No. 1 hereto). As
a result, the parties filed the Joint Motion on December 20, 2001 asking this Court
to temporarily remand the case to the district court so that Judge Dever could
conference with Judge Thorne and sort out the discrepancy; this Court temporarily
remanded the matter to Judge Dever. (R. 1344). A copy of the Order (for temporary
remand) is attached hereto as Addendum No. 2. On June 5,2002, Judge Dever made
a minute entry resolving the discrepancy. (R. 1352). A copy of the Minute Entry is
attached hereto as Addendum No. 3.
According to Judge Dever's minute entry (Add. No. 3), he consulted with
Judge Thorne regarding the discrepancy between the two findings and decrees. He
concluded and ruled that Judge Thorne had signed the original proposedfindingsand
conclusions under the assumption that there were no objections by Mrs. Menz when
in fact there was an objection on file by Mrs. Menz. He also concluded that the
parties and Judge Dever were unaware that there were any signedfindingsand decree
at the time Mr. Menz submitted to Judge Dever revised findings and decree in
December of 2000, which had been prepared by counsel for Mr. Menz and approved
by counsel for Mrs. Menz. Judge Dever ruled that the decree he signed on January
5

16,2001."... is the Decree of Divorce in this case. The Findings of Fact and Decree
entered in error on June 30,2002, [referring to those signed by Judge Thorne] are set
aside."
Despite the clear and unambiguous ruling of Judge Dever (R. 1352, Add. No.
3 herein), Mr. Menz, still persists in claiming that there are two sets of findings and
decrees and that as a result, Mrs. Menz' "Objections to Respondent's Proposed
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law" (R. 1110) and her Motion to Amend
constitute two "motions to amend" which is not permitted under the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
In order to reach this analysis and conclusion, Mr. Menz has distorted the facts
and the law in his Appellee's Brief to this Court. He repeatedly uses terms such as
"both requests to modify", "amended twice", "Second Memorandum of Petitioner",
"second proceeding commenced by Gail Menz to amend the findings and decree",
"two objections",".. .allowing a hearing and awarding relief on the second motion.
..", and "another motion to modify".
Mr. Menz can characterize the proceedings however he pleases, but it does not
change the fact that there are not now, and never were, two valid findings and
decrees-there is only one set of findings and decree which is the Dever Findings and
Decree.
6

POINT II
PURSUANT TO UTAH RULE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 63(a), JUDGE DEVER HAD
AUTHORITY TO ENTER FINDINGS OF
FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
DECREE OF DIVORCE EVEN THOUGH
JUDGE THORNE HAD TRIED THE CASE
Mr. Menz has argued that Judge Dever did not have the authority to change
Judge Thome's decision/mling. Beside the fact that Mr. Menz cites no legal
authority to support his position, Mr. Menz has already tacitly agreed that Judge
Menz had authority to not only enter findings and a decree, but that he had authority
to change Judge Thome's award and recalculate the property/money distribution.
To illustrate Mr. Menz' acknowledgment of Judge Dever's authority, Mr. Menz
has never disputed or complained about the fact that Judge Dever credited $18,000
to Mrs. Menz' side of the ledger as the value of her automobile even though Judge
Thome had not included that amount in his calculations. (See page 9, para. 9 of
Appellee's Brief). The result benefitted Mr. Menz by increasing the lien granted to
Mr. Menz on the marital abode by the sum of $ 18,000. Mr. Menz refers to that error
of Judge Thome as a "defect in the calculations" of Judge Thome. IcL This re-
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calculation of the division of marital property was done pursuant to an exparte
communication, i.e., a letter Mr. Menz' attorney had sent to the Court along with his
proposed findings and decree. Judge Dever explained this re-calculation in his
minute entry of November 2, 2000 (R. 1160), a copy of which is attached hereto as
Addendum No. 4.
Mr. Menz, however, now disputes Judge Dever's authority to re-calculate and
correct calculations of Judge Thorne that benefit Mrs. Menz.
Aside from Mr. Menz' implicit recognition of Judge Dever's authority as a
successor Judge, Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 63(a) provides for a successor judge
to step in when the Judge who tried the case is unable to finish the case due to a
disability. Rule 63(a) provides:
Rule 63. Disability or disqualification of a judge.
(a) Substitute judge; prior testimony. If the judge to
whom an action has been assigned is unable to perform
the duties required of the court under these rules, then
any other judge assigned pursuant to Judicial Council
rule is authorized to perform those duties. The judge to
whom the case is assigned may in the exercise of discretion
rehear the evidence or some part of it.
Under Utah law, the resignation of a Judge is a "disability" within the meaning
of Rule 63(a). Butler v. Wilkinson. 740 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1987): State v. Kelsev. 532
P.2d 1001 (Utah 1975). Judge Thorne resigned from the Third District Court to take
8

a position with the Utah Court of Appeals. Thus, he was disabled within the meaning
of Rule 63(a).
When a case is tried without a jury, as was the Menz case, and the disabled
judge who tried the case has rendered a decision and expressed/stated his findings and
conclusions, Rule 63(a) permits a successor judge (Judge Dever in this case) who did
not try the case to enter formal Findings and Conclusions and Judgment which are
consistent with such decision andfindingsand do not divergefromthe decision and
findings on material matters. See Butler, supra: see Kelsey. supra. It is worth noting
that Rule 63(a) has been revised since Butler and Kelsey. At the time those cases
were heard, the rule included a requirement that for a successor judge to have
authority in a matter tried before the disabled judge, a verdict must have been
rendered or findings filed. The statute has been revised and its current version
became effective November 1,1999 (prior to the Menz trial). The current version is
less restrictive than the prior one because on its face; it essentially gives the
successor judge unfettered discretion to perform an act regarding a case, regardless
of the stage of the proceeding. Therefore, the Butler and Kelsey cases may not
accurately state the powers of a successor judge under the current version of Rule
63(a). The powers may be even broader under the current version.
Nevertheless, Judge Dever's actions pass muster even under the Butler and
9

Kelsey cases. Judge Dever did not try the case, rather, Judge Thorne did. Judge
Thorne put his decision and findings on the record in open court. (R. 1348; see Add.
No. 1 to Appellant's Brief). Judge Thome's decision was essentially that the marital
property should be divided equally between the parties, neither party should be
awarded alimony, the credit card debt is a community debt and should be equally paid
by the parties, and the parties inheritances are marital, not separate, property. The
Dever Findings and Decree (R. 1184 and 1194; see Addenda No.s 3 and 7 to
Appellant's Brief) are entirely consistent with Judge Thome's ruling in every respect.
Judge Dever divided the value of the marital property equally, he denied alimony to
either party, he split the credit card debt and awarded the parties' inheritances as
marital, not separate property. The only difference in the property awardfromJudge
Thome's award was that Judge Dever, at Mr. Menz request, added the $ 18,000 auto
of Mrs. Menz to Mrs. Menz' side of the ledger and thereby increased the lien
awarded to Mr. Menz on the marital abode by the sum of $18,000.
Mr. Menz agrees that Judge Dever's award of property was the same as Judge
Thome's, except to correct a "defect in the calculations" of Judge Thome (See
Appellee's Brief, pg. 9, para. 9). Yet Mr. Menz then asserts that Judge Dever
"drastically changefd]" the proposed findings "originally approved by Judge Thome"
which "frankly appear to be necessary and supportive to a degree of the decisions
10

made by Judge Thorne . . . " (See Appellee's Brief, p. 35).
Judge Dever did strike some of the language in the proposed findings and
decree that Mr. Menz had submitted (R. 1160, 1184, and 1197). A copy of the
proposed Findings and Conclusions which Judge Dever interlineated are attached to
Addendum No. 4 hereto. It is evident from a brief review of Addendum No. 4 that
the changes Judge Dever made were not "material" or substantive and merely brought
the Findings and Decree in line with the actual findings made by Judge Thorne in his
ruling on the record. For example, on page 3, No. s 5 and 6 of Mr. Menz proposed
findings were stricken by Judge Dever. These proposed findings dealt with the
grounds for divorce. Mrs. Menz had alleged adultery and abandonment on the part
of Mr. Menz. (See Verified Complaint, R. 1-14). Mr. Menz had included a proposed
finding that there was no evidence that Mr. Menz had been unfaithful to Mrs. Menz
prior to the commencement of the action. A review of the trial transcripts and of
Judge Thome's ruling (R. 1348 and Add. No. 1 to Appellant's Brief) clearly
demonstrates that Judge Thorne never made such a statement. In fact the trial
transcript reveals that Mrs. Menz did in fact present evidence that Mr. Menz was seen
leaving the home of another woman in the early morning hours. (See Trial Transcript,
R. 1349 beginning at p. 129). In his ruling, Judge Thorne stated "[c]ertainly, each
side can point fingers and say they're at fault for this or they're at fault for that." (R.
11

1348 at p. 46; see Add. No. 1 to Appellant's Brief). Thus, for Judge Dever to allow
such a finding would not have been consistent with Judge Thome's findings and the
evidence; it would have been contrary. Furthermore, it was not material to a finding
of irreconcilable differences as grounds for divorce.
As another example, on pages 11,12, and 13 of Mr. Menz proposed findings,
(Addendum 4 hereto), Judge Dever struck paragraphs 41 through 53 which dealt
soley with the parties' earning potentials and Mr. Menz' reasons for not working.
These paragraphs (while not entirely accurate as proposed by Mr. Menz) would only
be material if alimony were to be awarded. However, Judge Thome expressly stated
"I'm not going to award alimony. I'm going to find that with assets of $665,000 each,
they have the ability to support themselves." (R. 1348 at p. 48; see Addendum No. 1
to Appellant's Brief). Thus, for Judge Dever to include three pages of findings
regarding employment history and earning potential would have been inconsistent
with Judge Thome's ruling and immaterial.
Despite Mr. Menz' attempts to convince this Court otherwise, the original
proposed findings submitted to Judge Thome by Mr. Menz were not Judge Thome's
words-Judge Thome's findings were clearly set out in his oral rulingfromthe bench.
The proposed findings which Judge Dever struck were the machinations of Mr.
Menz' and his counsel's minds. Mr. Menz' argument that Judge Dever made
12

substantial changes to necessary findings by Judge Thome is just another distortion
of the facts and the record in an attempt to sway this Court.

POINT HI
PURSUANT TO UTAH RULE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 59(a), JUDGE DEVER HAD
THE AUTHORITY TO AMEND HIS PRIOR
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS EVEN
THOUGH HE DID NOT TRY THE CASE

Mr. Menz has asserted (again without legal citation), that Judge Dever did not
have the authority (or abused his discretion) to correct the calculations of Judge
Thome's property awards or to correct Judge Thome's ruling regarding the parties'
inheritances.
Many courts in many jurisdictions across the United States have been
confronted with a similar question, i.e.. the extent of the authority of a successor
judge under Rule 59(a) to amend or make new findings in a case which was heard by
a different judge (not a jury). The general consensus appears to be that under Rule
59(a), the second judge (successor judge) is not barred from re-examining the first
judge's decision, vacating it, amending it or granting a new trial. See 58 Am. Jur.
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2d. New Trial. §202: see 20 ALR Fed. 13 (1974). While the prior judgment is not res
judicata, courts generally give some deference and respect to the prior judge's ruling.
It is a matter of comity and respect .IcL Mr. Menz' statement in his brief, that the
successor judge should afford great weight to the prior judge's ruling, is simply not
the applicable legal standard. Not surprisingly, Mr. Menz did not cite any legal
authority for that statement.
In Anderson v. Dewey. 82 Idaho 173 (Idaho 1960). 350 P.2d 734 (Idaho 1960)
, the Idaho Court was confronted with a situation similar to the case at bar. The
Idaho Court ruled that where a case is tried without a jury and a motion under Rule
59(a) is heard by a successor to the trial judge, the successor judge may make new
findings and conclusions and direct the entry of a new judgment if he is not required
in doing so to weigh conflicting evidence or pass upon credibility of witnesses, and
he may exercise the same authority as could the judge who tried the case. IcL
Judge clearly accorded deference to Judge Thome's decision to split the marital
property equally, deny alimony, and split the marital credit card debt. There were no
facts in dispute that needed resolution and the credibility of a witness was not in issue
at the hearing on Mrs. Menz Motion to Amend. (See hearing transcript at R. 1351; see
Add. No. 2 to Appellant's Brief which is the portion of the transcript where Judge
Dever gave his ruling on the Motion).
14

The Court in Anderson, supra, also stated that a successor judge " . . . has the
same authority as his predecessor and authority to set aside his predecessor's findings
of fact, conclusions of law, judgment and decree and enter new ones adverse to the
old." Id At 179.
Three of the four changes made by Judge Dever were simply calculation errors
on the part of Judge Thome, just like the $18,000 auto Judge Thorne had forgotten
to put on Mrs. Menz' side of the ledger. As previously acknowledged by Mr. Menz,
Judge Dever did have the power to correct a calculation error without abusing his
discretion or violating any legal principle.
The fourth issue was one of law-whether the inheritances of the parties were
separate or marital property. As stated above, a successor judge is not bound by the
prior judges interpretation of the law, and it would be appropriate for the successor
judge to rule differently to prevent an injustice. See 58 Am. Jur. 2d §202. supra: 20
ALRFed. 13. supra..
Mr. Menz' argument that Judge Dever was limited to either granting or
denying a new trial to Mrs. Menz is simply incorrect. The very wording of the Rule
makes it abundantly clear that the court has numerous options; it can "open the
judgment, if one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact
and conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry
15

the parties. (See Motion and Memorandum at R. 1205 and R. 1260). An affadavit
was submitted in regard to surprise. (R.

). Mr. Menz asserts that there was no

"surprise". Whether or not "surprise" existed is immaterial because Judge Dever
made his ruling on the inheritances under subsection (6) "error of law". (R. 1351).
POINT IV
UNDER UTAH LAW, MONEY INHERITED
BY A SPOUSE IS SEPARATE PROPERTY AND
IF IT HAS BEEN COMMINGLED WITH JOINT
MARITAL PROPERTY, IT SHOULD BE AWARDED
TO THE SPOUSE WHO INHERITED IT IF IT CAN
BE TRACED AND IDENTIFIED
Mr. Menz cited Mortensen v. Mortensen. 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 1988) as the law
in Utah on the awarding of the parties' inheritances. Mrs. Menz agrees that
Mortensen is the law on that matter. It supports the proposition that the two
inheritances should have been awarded as separate property. Judge Dever adhered
to the principle of law that even if the inherited funds have been commingled with
joint marital funds, they are to be awarded as separate property if they can be traced.
Both Mr. and Mrs. Menz agree that they put their inheritances into an account
that also contained joint monies. They both agree that over the years, the parties
withdrew funds from the Joint Fidelity Account for various family expenses, family
trips, family automobiles, gifts and autos for their children; thus, funds withdrawn for
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such family purposes was joint money for joint expenses. Judge Dever reasoned that
since the account held significantly more than the amount of the inheritances that had
been deposited into that account, the unused portion contained each party's inherited
sums, that is, it could be and was separate property because it could be traced into that
account. (See Judge Thome's ruling at R. 1351 and Addendum No. 2 to Appellant's
Brief).
Mr. Menz complains that since the amount each inheritance earned cannot be
determined and thus awarded to the proper party, that none of the inheritance, even
the readily identifiable portion of the inheritance, the principal, should be awarded
as separate. This makes no sense and is contrary to the entire concept and policy
reasons for awarding an inheritance to the spouse who inherited it. It really appears
that Mr. Menz is not necessarily against the concept but just thinks he should have
been awarded the earnings on the principal sum. This is not possible without some
complex tracing, which Mr. Menz did not do and Mr. Menz did not attempt to trace
the amount earned on his inheritance. It would be contrary to Utah law to refuse to
award the identifiable and traceable principal just because the earnings have not or
cannot be traced. That would be throwing the baby out with the bath.

18

POINT V
MRS. MENZ IS ENTITLED TO AN
AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES
BECAUSE MR. MENZ' APPEAL IS
FRIVOLOUS AND HIS ARGUMENTS
DO NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS
OF RULE 24(j) FOR ACCURACY
This Court has stated that " . . . when an appeal is frivolous.. .we will award
fees regardless of the trial court's ruling on fees."Burt v. Burt. 799 P.2d 1166 (Utah
App. 1990). Rule 24(j)ofthe Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure require briefs to
be presented with "accuracy" and to be "freefromburdensom, irrelevant, immaterial
or scandalous matters. Briefs which are not in compliance may be disregarded or
stricken,... and the court may assess attorney fees against the offending lawyer.'Td.
At the time of submitting his Appellee's Brief, Mr. Menz was well aware that
Judge Thorne only signed the proposed findings because he assumed there were no
objections from Mrs. Menz. (See Addendum No. 3 hereto). He is also aware that
those findings are not part of the record and have been set aside. WL Yet Mr. Menz
has repeatedly distorted and misstated the facts and the record by his continued
insistence that there are two findings and decrees, that Mrs. Menz brought two
motions to amend, and so on, despite the clear ruling from Judge Dever on the Joint
Motion which both parties had made to resolve the question. This is not only
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frivolous and innacurate, it borders on "scandalous". Further, Mr. Menz had the
ability to solve the issue raised by Mrs. Menz appeal but repeatedly refused to do so,
i.e.. Mr. Menz could have and should have provided documentation regarding the
funds in his individual Joint Fidelity Account. As a result, thousands of dollars have
been spent on attorneys fees and costs and hundreds of hours of this Court's and the
lower court's time have been wasted. (See discussion in Part II below). Mr. Menz'
Appellee's Brief shoud be stricken and attorney fees awarded to Mrs. Menz.
PART II: REPLY TO MR. MENZ' RESPONSE TO MRS. MENZ'
BRIEF (APPELLANT'S BRIEF)
Mrs. Menz has asked this Court to award her half of the sum of $76,781 which
is the sum in Mr. Menz separate investment account (the Fidelity Investment
Account) which has not been "traced" as separate property.
Mr. Menz argues that sum reflects earnings on his separate property of
$202,211 over the course of 13 months. Mr. Menz stated at trial that the sum
reflected such earnings and that he did not make deposits into that account after the
$201,211 was transferred into it. However, even if that were true, Mr. Menz did not
testify or present any documentation at trial as to how much was in that account prior
to the placement of his separate $201,211 into it. In his Appellant's Brief, pp. 12-13,
para. 32, he states that he "then took that money [referring to the $201,211] and
20

deposited it into a new account with Fidelity in his name alone." This is a false
statement. A review of the trial transcript cited by Mr. Menz, "Trial T. Vol 2, p. 201,
11. 11-13" shows that Mr. Menz did not testify that it was a "new" account. While it
is possible (although highly improbable) that the $76,781 reflects earnings, and while
it may be true that Mr. Menz did not make any deposits into that account after
depositing the $201,211 into it, it certainly raises the question as to why Mr. Menz
refused repeatedly to provide such documentation to Mrs. Menz and why Mr. Menz
refused to offer any documentation at trial. That would have resolved the issue right
then-perhaps that is exactly what Mr. Menz was afraid of. Even at the hearing on
Mrs. Menz' Motion to Amend in April of 2001, knowing that Mrs. Menz was seeking
a division of that excess $76, 781, Mr. Menz again did not produce any
documentation even though the Court had the power and authority to open up that
issue and take evidence on it. Mr. Menz' refusal to provide "tracing" documentation
has wasted numerous hours of this Court's time and the lower Court's time, and has
taken numerous hours of Mrs. Menz' time and cost her thousands of dollars in
attorney fees and costs.
All of the cases that discuss the fact that separate property once commingled
with joint property must be traceable, contemplate just that-tracing by virtue of
documentation, not just self-serving statements.
21

Mr. Menz admittedly withdrew at least $20,000 in the 13 months the money
was in the account prior to trial. So if the $201,211 had been the only money in that
account, it would have earned and almost impossible return of 48% per annum. The
bottom line is that Mr. Menz failed to meet his burden and demonstrate to the Court
that the $76,781 was his separate property.
This Court should overrule Judge Dever on this issue and direct him to divide
the sum and make the necessary calculations and orders.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, this Court should (1) deny Mr. Menz' appeal;
(2)grant Mrs. Menz appeal and award her half of the $76,781; and (3) award Mrs.
Menz attorney fees for bringing her appeal and for defending against Mr. Menz'
appeal
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED thi

Syzanne West, Atprney for Appellant
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PROOF OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 2#h day of January, 2003,1 caused two copies of the
forgoing document, REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT, to be deposited in the United
States postal service, postage prepaid, addressed to:
Gregory B. Wall
Wall & Wall
Suite 200
4460 S. Highland Dr.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

GAIL PATRICIA MENZ,

;

Petitioner / Appellant/CrossAppellee
]
)
vs.

]

WILLIAM JEFFREY MENZ,

]

Appellate Court No. 20010567-CA

Respondent/ Appellee/Cross- ]
Appellee.
]

ADDENDA
1. Joint Motion for Correction or Modification of Record
and for leave to Amend
2. Order of the Utah Court of Appeals temporarily remanding
case
3. Minute Entry, dated June 5, 2002, by Judge Dever regarding
the remand
4. Minute Entry by Judge Dever, dated November 2, 2000 with
attached interlineated proposed "Findings of Fact and Conclusions
Law" and interlineated proposed "Decree of Divorce".

24

ADDENDUM NO.

/

Suzanne West (3430)
Attorney for Petitioner
908 Baker Avenue
Salmon, Idaho 83467
Telephone: (208) 756-4401
Facsimile No.: (208) 756-8328

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

GAIL PATRICIA MENZ,
Petitioner and Cross-respondent,

vs.
WILLIAM JEFFREY MENZ,
Respondent and Cross-Petitioner.

JOINT MOTION FOR CORRECTION
OR MODIFICATION OF RECORD
AND FOR LEAVE TO AMEND
Appellate Court No. 20010567-CA

INTRODUCTION
COME NOW Petitioner, Gail Patricia Menz, by and through her counsel, Suzanne
West, and Respondent, William Jeffrey Menz, by and through his counsel, Gregory B. Wall,
and jointly move this Court for an Order:
(1) directing Judge William Thorne and Judge Leon A. Dever to attempt to explain,
clarify, correct or modify certain aspects of the record on appeal as more fully explained
below; and
(2) for leave for either party to amend her/his appeal and docketing statement
following this Court's Order. This joint Motion is made pursuant to Rule 11(h) of the I>.ui
Rules of Appellate Procedure and a mediation conference which was conducted on October
30,2001.

GROUNDS FOR MOTION
The grounds for this Motion are that it appears there is a difference as to what the
record discloses and what occurred in the trial court. Resolution of this discrepancy would
greatly simplify the issues on appeal. The parties have, therefore, agreed to bring this motion
jointly.
The discrepancy in the record, as more fully explained in the chronology of Stipulated
Facts, infra, is as follows: On January 16, 2001, Judge Dever (who replaced Judge Thorne in
the lower court in this matter in the summer of 2000) signed one set of Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and a Decree of Divorce (hereinafter, "Dever Documents"); subsequently,
another set of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Decree of Divorce was
discovered which appear to be signed by Judge Thorne and bear the date of June 30, 2000,
(hereinafter "Thorne Documents"); the existence of the Thorne Documents was not know n to
either party (and apparently not to Judge Dever) at the time Judge Dever signed the Dever
Documents; on June 6, 2001, pursuant to Petitioner's Motion to Amend under U.R.C.P. 59,
Judge Dever signed an Order Amending Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of
Divorce (hereinafter, "Amended Findings and Decree"). Petitioner has appealed a portion of
the Amended Findings and Decree" and Respondent has cross-appealed all orders signed by
Judge Dever, including the Dever Documents and the Amended Findings and Decree. It is
Petitioner's position that the Thorne Documents do not affect the validity of the Amended
Findings and Decree; it is Respondent's position that the Thorne Documents invalidate both
the Dever Documents and the Amended Findings and Decree.
The parties have agreed that within five days of filing this motion either party may P'e
a memorandum, not to exceed three pages, explaining that party's position on this matter.
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RELIEF REQUESTED
The parties request that this Court enter an Order directing Judge Thome and Judge
Dever, within sixty (60) days of this Court's Order, to prepare a written response to the
following four questions:
(1) did Judge Thorne actually bign the "Thorne Documents" (see paragraph 16 below);
(2) if so, did Judge Thorne do so intentionally, with knowledge that Petitioner had
filed objections to Respondent's Propobed Findings and Decree (see paragraph 7 below);
(3) if the answers to (l)and (2) are yes, then why was the existence of the Thorne
Documents unknown to the parties and Judge Dever; and
(4) what should be done to resolve the discrepancy and clarify the status of the case on
appeal?
The Parties further request thai both be given leave to amend their appeal/cross-appeal
and docketing statements once this disviepancy in the record has been resolved.

STIPULATED FACTS
1. Until approximately July o\ 2000, Judge Thorne was the Judge assigned to this
matter in the lower court; he heard the iial in February, 2000 and heard closing arguments on
April 28, 2000 at which time, Judge lb >rne ruled orally from the bench.
2. A transcript of closing arguments and Judge Thome's ruling of April 28, 2000 was
ordered by counsel for the parties to ,iMSt in preparing findings of fact and conclusions of
law and the decree of divorce
3. The transcript was receive

y counsel about the end of May or early June, 2000.

4. Counsel for Respondent p.

red proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

3

Law and Decree of Divorce (hereinal : Proposed Findings and Decree"). Attached to the
Proposed Findings and Decree was a . c. ificate by counsel for Respondent stating that he rad
mailed the proposed Decree of Divorce 10 counsel for Petitioner on June 6, 2000, and that if
the Decree of Divorce had not been ;

ioved by June 13, 2000, it would be submitted to the

court for signature. Counsel for Petit.*- cr had moved to Salmon, Idaho prior to that date.
Although the certificate states that the proposed Decree had been mailed to counsel for
Petitioner at the correct Idaho addres>

ounsel for Petitioner had not received the Proposed

Findings and Decree by June 13, 200 )
5. On June 14, 2000, counsel for Respondent submitted the Proposed Findings and
Decree to Judge Thome for signature, along with a cover letter stating that no reponse had
been received from counsel for Petit ;:cr and requesting Judge Thorne to sign the Proposed
Findings and Decree as submitted. A c< py of the cover letter is attached hereto as Exhibit
No. 1. Also on June 14, 2000, coun^ I for Respondent faxed to counsel for Petitioner a copy
of the cover letter, Exhibit No. 1.
6. Upon receiving the fax, c^'..-el for Petitioner telephoned counsel for Respondent
and informed him that she had never received the Proposed Findings and Decree and arranged
with counsel for Respondent to pro\ .i he documents and give Petitioner until June 21,
2000 to object. Counsel for Petitioi

lephoned Judge Thome's clerk and advised her of the

extension to June 21, 2000 for filing objections.
7. On June 21, 2000, counsc ; , Petitioner filed "Petitioner's Objections to
Respondent's Proposed Findings of

and Conclusions of Law "(hereinafter "Objections").

On July 10, 2000, counsel for Resp<

.t filed a Notice to Submit regarding Petitioner's

Objections.
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8. During July, 2000, both c . ^d made calls to Judge Thome's clerk to inquire
about the status of the Proposed Find

and Decree and Petitioner's Objections. Judge

Thome's clerk informed both attorne

kit Judge Thome had not ruled on the Proposed

Findings and Conclusions and the Ol

^u>ns and that Judge Thome had left the Third District

Court to go to the Utah Court of Ap> c tK and there would be a new Judge assigned who
would resolve the matter.
9. Throughout August, Sepu

i , and October, 2000, counsel for both parties made

inquiries concerning the status. Coui^d tor both parties were informed by Judge Dever's
clerk that Judge Leon A. Dever had < ui assigned to the case and he would need to review
the matter. A copy of the transcript

1 udge Thome's ruling on April 28, 2000 was provided

to Judge Dever to assist him in his c jsiun.
10. On November 2, 2000, Ji

v Dever made a minute entry wherein he accepted a

portion of Petitioner's Objections an< , nied others. He also granted Respondent the
increased lien award which Responc

counsel had requested in the cover letter to Judge

Thorne, Exhibit No. 1 hereto. Judg

K \er marked corrections and deletions directly on .he

Proposed Findings and Decree. He i e.ted Respondent's attorney to revise the Proposed
Findings and Decree accordingly. 1
^__A4ollar or property award to the Part

visions made by Judge Dever did not cnange the
«. vcept the increase in the lien to Respondent, noted

above. A true and correct copy of t

\hnute Entry with the attached Proposed Findings and

Decree with Judge Dever's correctio

attached hereto as Exhibit No. 2. The signalure line

for the Judge on said attached Prop*

indings and Decree is unsigned.

11. On January 16, 2001, .

Oever signed the revised findings of fact and

conclusions of law and decree of di

which had been prepared by counsel for Respondent

and approved by counsel for Petitic

hese documents are referred to supra and infra as
5

the "Dever Documents", a true and v
12. On January 24, 2001, co,

a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit No. 3
for Petitioner filed a motion under Rule 59 of the

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure entit

^doner's Motion to Amend Findings of Fact,

Conclusions of Law, and Decree of

ice" (hereinafter "Motion to Amend"). A true and

copy of the Motion to Amend is ati
13. On April 4, 2001, a her

hereto as Exhibit No. 4.
as held before Judge Dever on Petitioner's Motion

to Amend. At the hearing, counsel

jspondent questioned whether Judge Dever had

authority to hear the motion, statinr

^oth Judge Thorne and Judge Dever had signed a

decree of divorce. Counsel for Petit

disputed that Judge Thorne had ever signed a

decree. Judge Dever stated that he

not aware of any decree signed by Judge Thorne.

The hearing proceeded and Judge D

uled from the bench, granting part and denying part

of the relief sought by Petitioner.
14. On June 6, 2001, Judge

signed an Order Amending Findings of Fact,

Conclusions of Law and Decree of

je (hereinafter "Amended Findings and Decree").

which embodied the ruling made b N

J Dever on April 4, 2001. A true and correct copy

of the Amended Findings and Decn

ttached hereto as Exhibit No. 5.

15. Petitioner filed this app^

.he sole issue of the relief denied Petitioner by Judge

Dever in the Amended Findings ar

je, Paragraph 1 and 4.G., Exhibit No. 5, hereto,

Respondent cross-appealed on the c

vmended Findings and Decree and "all associated

and prior judgments and orders in i

e, except for the original findings and decree signed

and entered by the Honorable Willi

Thorne, from which no appeal is taken."

16. Counsel for Respondem

t Docketing Statement on or about September 6,

2001. Attached to that Docketing

jnt are copies of documents entitled "Findings o r

Fact and Conclusions of Law" and

c of Divorce", both of which bear the date of June

30, 2000 and appear to bear the sigi

>f Judge Thome. These documents refered to supra

and infra as the "Thome Document17. After counsel for Petitio

jived Respondent's Docketing Statement, she

contacted counsel for Defendant am

ed about the Thome Documents. She

informed Respondent's counsel that

d never seen or known of any such documents and

was unaware that Respondent or hi^

el had seen or known of the existence of any such

documents. Counsel for Respondei

i that he had not known of the Thome Documents

until he was reviewing the court fill

lime in spring of 2001, prior to the April 4, 2001

hearing on Petitioner's Motion to A
the Thorne Documents to Judge De
did not provide copies to Petitioner

Counsel for Respondent did not provide a copy of
iher before, during or after the April 4, 2001, and
sel until they were attached to Respondent's

Docketing Statement in September.
18. Counsel for Petitioner e
review the court records, talk to th*.

the services of Cindy Paul, a Utah attorney, to
and search for an explanation of the Thome

Documents. Attached hereto as E>

o. 6 is the Affadavit of Cindy Paul regarding her

search of the records and discussio

clerks. As explained in the Affadavit, there was

considerable difficulty in locating i

me Documents and no readily apparent explanation

for the discrepancy.
19. Attached hereto as Exh.

7 are copies of the "Thorne Documents" as they

presently exist in the Third Disti

irt file. Except for the "post-it" notes appearing on

the Findings, the Thorne Documen

;e identical to Respondent's original Propsed

Findings and Decree as they were

ed to Judge Thorne on June 14, 2000; and, with the

exception of the "post-it" notes, th

e Documents are identical to the unsigned copies of

the Proposed Findings and Decree

oh Judge Dever made his corrections and changes
7

ee Exhibit No. 2 and paragraph 10 above),

per his November 2, 2000 Minute

jhed to Respondent's Docketing Statement do not

20. The "Thorne Documei.
contain the "post-it" notes that app^

he Court documents. When Counsel for

Repsondent first found the "Thorne

lents" in spring of 2001, the Findings contained the

"post-it" note that states: "Judge T).

\ere are objections from Suzanne Wect. Do you

want me to set tel/conf." Counsel

pondent believes he wrote the other two "post-it"

notes to the court clerk when he o1

copies of the Thorne Documents in spring of 2001.
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R FOR RELIEF

The Parties jointly pray for

lowing relief:

1. That this Court enter an

equiring that within sixty(60) days of the Order,

Judges Thorne and Dever prepare
(1) did Judge Thorne actm.
(2) if so, did Judge Thorne
filed objections to Respondent's P
(3) if the answers to (l)am
Documents unknown to the partie

n response to the following four questions:
the "Thorne Documents" (see paragraph 16 above);
intentionally, with knowledge that Petitioner had
1 Findings and Decree (see paragraph 7 above);
i yes, then why was the existence of the Thorne
ldge Dever; and

(4) what should be done t«

o the discrepancy and clarify the status on appeal?

2. That this Court grant \

.i parties leave to amend their appeal/cross-appeal and

docketing statements once this di^

DATED this

I

da^

y in the record has been resolved,
oember, 2001,

/Suzanne West,'Attorney for Petitioner

Gregory B. Wall, Attorney for Resoondent

ADDENDUM NO.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

DEC 21 2001
Pautette Stagg
Clerk of tfte Court

ooOoo
Gail Patricia Menz,

ORDER

Appellant and Cross-appellee,
v.

Case NO. 2D010567-CA

William Jeffrey Menz,
Appellee and Cross-appellant.

This matter is before the court on a stipulated motion to
temporarily remand the case to the district court to correct or
modify the record pursuant to Rule 11(h) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure. Jointly/ the parties raise several
questions regarding differences in the district court record that
must "be submitted to and settled by that court." Id.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that' the motion for temporary remand is
granted. Upon the trial court's disposition of this matter, the
clerk shall immediately transmit the supplemental record to this
court.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties are granted twentyone days from the entry of trial court's disposition to amend
their respective docketing statements on appeal.
DATED this^gfcifC day of December, 2001.
FOR THE COURT:

£&nela T. Greenwood,
Presiding Judge

ADDENDUM NO.
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE DIVISION
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
GAIL PATRICIA MENZ,
MINUTE ENTRY
Petitioner,

:

vs.
Case No. 984908014
WILLIAM JEFFREY MENZ,
:

Judge: L.A. Dever

Respondent.

Pursuant to the request of the parties, a conference was held between Judge Wm Thome and
Judge L.A. Dever concerning the conflict between the two decrees issued in this case.
Judge Thome's position is that the Decree dated June 30, 2000, was signed under the
assumption that there were no objections to the proposed decree. The original decree is not part of the
file. The Court has a photocopy of the decree signed by Judge Thome. The record establishes that an
objection had been made to the proposed findings and decree.
A hearing was conducted on the objections to the proposed decree. At the time of the hearing,
no one presented evidence that a decree had been signed on June 30, 2000. On November 2, 2000,
Judge Dever signed a minute entry and directed the respondent's attorney to prepare findings of fact
and decree of divorce incorporating the changes made as a result of the hearing on the objections.
It appears from the file that the parties submitted to the Court a decree of divorce and findings
on or about December 19, 2000. This decree was prepared by Mr. Wall and approved by Ms. West.
The only logical deduction that can be made is that the parties did not believe that findings and a decree
had be made before Judge Thome left the bench and therefore submitted the documents.
Since the decree of December 19, 2000, was approved by the parties and signed by Judge
Dever, it is the Decree of Divorce in this case. The Findings of Fact and Decree entered in error on June
30, 2000, are set aside.

It should be noted, however, that the Decree approved by the parties on December 19, 2000,
and signed by Judge Dever on January 16, 2001, is incomplete, having error between page 3 and 4.
Dated this
2002
lis V
Q day of ^fcfil,
flmf, 2(

BY THE COURT

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
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I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Minute Entry was mailed on the
day of-Aorit 2002, to the following:
Gregory B. Wall
5200 South Highland Drive, Ste 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Suzanne West
207 Neyman Street
Salmon, Idaho 83467

i
Deputy Court Clerk

ADDENDUM NO.

'"Ssssere
'Jua^'oSSSr
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE DIVISION
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
GAIL PATRICIA MENZ,
MINUTE ENTRY
Petitioner,
vs
Case No 984908014
WILLIAM JEFFREY MENZ,
Judge. L.A. Dever
Respondent.

The Court has reviewed the memoranda of the parties objecting and responding to the
Proposed Findings and Decree in the above named case. The Court has accepted a portion of
the Petitioner's requests for change. Attached to this Minute Entry is a copy of the Proposed
Findings and Decree The Court has made corrections and deletions on the copy which are to
be incorporated by Respondent's attorney
In reviewing the division of property, it is the Court's position that Judge Thorne clearly
expressed his intention to divide the marital estate equally From the reading of the transcript, it
is obvious that one item of properly that was determined to be in the estate, the petitioner's
auto was omitted from the calculations. Judge Thorne equalized the estate by granting the
respondent a hen on the home awarded to the petitioner The hen should be in the amount of
$66 150 00 and not the $48,150 00 stated in the transcript A hen in the amount of $66,150 00
would equalize the estate as intended by Judge Thorne

Dated this 2nd day of November, 2000

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION

the J^>

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Minute Entry was mailed on
day of November, 2000, to the following:
Gregory B. Wall
5200 South Highland Drive, Ste 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Suzanne West
207 Neyman Street
Salmon, Idaho 83467

IFflHi @®(FT

GREGORY B. WALL (3365)
WALL & WALL
Attorneys for Respondent
52C0 S. Highland Dr., Ste 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84 117
274-3100

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY.
STATE OF UTAH
)

iGAIL PATRICIA MENZ,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Petitioner
Civil NO. 984908014
[WILLIAM JEFFREY MENZ,
!l
Respondent:

Judge William A. Thorne
Comm. Thomas Arnett

The above captioned matter came on for trial before the court
bitting without a jury en February 22 and February 23, 2000, the
Honorable

William A. Thorne, district

judge, presiding.

The

petitioner is Gail Patricia Menz and she was represented by her
j

attorney Suzanne West.

The respondent is William Jeffrey Menz and

he was represented by his attorney Gregory B. Wall.
j

Each party was present, sworn and testified as to the issues

in this matter.

Other witnesses were also called, sworn and

testified on behalf of the various parties.

Various exhibits were

also offered by each party and received into evidence by the court.
Closing arguments were held on April 28, 2000.

Each of the

parties was personally present and represented by their respective
n w M * * A' i A W
) ! HC .Ml A N D D K l V f
:f (ITr i / t A i t 64 1 i,"
IM' • V * i rw.

counsel.

Based upon che foregoing, and the court being fully

advised in the premises and the law, does herewith make and enter
the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The parties were married to each other on November 26,
196", in Phoenix, Arizona, and ever since said date have been and
are now husband and wife.

Each party was a resident of Sale Lake

County, State of Utah, at the time this action was commenced, and
had

been

for at

least

three months

immediately

prior

to the

commencement of this action
2. There have been three children born as issue of this
marriage, however, all three are over 18 years of age, are married
and fully emancipated.

There are no minor children and no other

children are expected ae issue of this marriage.
3. Irreconcilable differences have arisen between the parties
making the continuation of the marriage impossible. In confronting
their differences it appears that the parties have attempted to
reach some resolution of their differences, but without success.
4. The petitioner nas also alleged mental cruelty as a ground
for her divorce.

It appears from the evidence that there have been

repeated disputes between the parties over finances during the
months preceding the filing of this action.

There have been claims

on both sides of lack of interest and involvement by the other
party in the marriage, end mutual claims of a lack of affection and
failure to assist and support the other party with their duties and
responsibilities in the marriage.

* T T O * M Y 5 AT IAV%
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ni

e petitioner has also alleged that the respondent was
unfaithful to h w : during the marriage, that he committed adultery
prior to the commencerft^ t of the divorce action, and that this was
a reason for the divorce

Hbw^ver, there is no compelling evidence

to show that the respondent was uhCaithful to the petitioner prior
no the commencement of this action, although he has admitted having
a relationship with another woman oniy^^fter

this action was

commenced and the parties separated.
6. The petitioner has also claimed that there has been some
Bhoving and argulHSrrfcaj^o1"1 o n the part of the respondent. Respondent
has testified that petitione^ha^failed to take care of herself,
has gained a substantial amount of weight>-hgis failed to assist and
pupport him in the maintenance of the home and otheTr*<amily duties,
pnd that she has been prodigal in her use of the family m^o^es.
7. There appears

aiuuuda fui mental Ciuclty by both.

'frtarMeg and sufficient grounds for a divorce are present to award
la divorce to the petitioner on the grounds Of meotal cruclafti^
,j

8. The parties

separated

in December,

1998, right after

iChristmas, and have not oohabitated with one another since that
jtime.
9. During the course of the marriage the parties have acquired
real property situated m Salt Lake County, State of Utah, at 4532
Crest Oak Circle, which property has been used as the primary
family residence.

That property is more particularly described as

fellows:

All of Lot 903 N:. Olympus Hills No. 9 Subdivision,
according to the official plat thereof as recorded
V * » A I ; I A PC

,
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in the office cf the Salt Lake County Recorder.
Parcel No. 27 - CI - 308-026
Trie petitioner still occupies the residence and has done so since
the separation

of the parties.

It is the express desire c£

petitioner Gail Menz :c retain possession and use of the family
residence.
1C. The fair market value of the residence is 5375,000.0c
There is a mortgage balance of approximately $62,000.00. The court:
finds that

there is equity in the residence in the amount of

•5313,000.00 .
•i
1

11. For the past number of years the parties have maintained

a joint investment account with Fidelity Investments. This account
as tied in with the stock market and therefore the value of the
account can fluctuate depending upon the activity of the stock
market.
12.

in August,

1995 Mr. Menz received

an

inheritance of

.$82,300.00 which he invested into the joint Fidelity Investments
.'account.
i

1 3 . A p p r o x i m a t e l y cwo y e a r s ago i n 1997 Mrs. Menz r e c e i v e d an
' i n h e r i t a n c e of $176,<cc 00 and i n v e s t e d $ 1 4 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 i n t o t h e same
i

.joint Fidelity Inves n\enc s account,
14. Very shortly oeiore the parties separated in late 1998,
Mrs. Menz made a number of withdrawals from the joint Fidelity
account that resultec n a net total to her of $261,000.00, leaving
$lfil!000. &4 in the a ecu—.

*Phc court findc that the parties frave

made diffQrcr»^-wgir^:-T::vrT^^
Nil «. V»A Vl |A .'C •
"TO* VlYS AT LAW
SO H K J K A i s i O O B l v r
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Mr

r°

inirnufc^r^

*nH

PYppnHi-irfl.s

ffcrcnt oumo remaining from these monies-

-by-sac* the partigo h*

«ar, t h i s time

rilIP

M. -'-

if—mint

«rorrr ^ n d ^ n v p ^ - ^- 8om§,

hnn i n r r r m r r t

nnrl Ur^—Men? haa-^

£he—court—finds—e4*e—fttct—t&a*

H r M c n r c account has

-: noaaQd in ^aluo oinee l a t e 1908 chould not-

A.,rr-\r

:__

-^.

v;^

dPtr-irr.r

:

i nCf?

Mrs^—Menz—SOOk.—^—upon—herself

u n i l a t e r a l l y and wit ctrt—'Jie kiiuwledge or consent of Mr—Men? ro
•mako—t&e—above—des<.v-1^3 i—withdrawals—£~em—fche—account,—which
exceeded hor ono-hal f- -sum e .

The court t h e r e f o r e f i n d s thac using

the above v a l u e s , whi-n r e f l e c t the amounts and v a l u e s at the time
1

Mrs. Menz made her withdrawals, is a fair and equitable point in
,time to value the account and the amounts taken.
•

IS. The court fi: ds that due to the joint uses, commingling of

the inheritance m e m e o: the parties, and the length of time which
jthe inheritance mon- -s were commingled in the joint Fidelity
account, the separac
their separate and

investments of inherited funds have lost
* r.ie; endent character and

therefore jointly own i funds* ^nri hw*
par~biae

QRlVC

• JOO
j T A j ' A41 . "

HO • > .• 7 4

1100

ce-3 i.nt.

has used as her separ

- v e h i c l e , a 1998 GMC Jimmy, with equity of

$18,000 . 00, based up:

re f a i r market v a l u e of the v e h i c l e and the

Me

Mr. Menz has

true with a value of

< ( C«TV

nmlirnril

?: automobile in her p o s s e s s i o n which she
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milting

16. Mrs. Menz h

testimony of Mrs

"> tti*H\A**0

h«f»r. rrpfffri ni mi^h-fry rhp7

inn 11 iirgnn

withdrawal a from the

identity and are

^

lased since the s e p a r a t i o n a 1999 pickup
00.00.

This i s t h e e q u i t y amount since

it appears that the ver.
18. Mrs. Menz had
her employment

as a scf

le
::(k
c^

,4--^=5WIT-

19. The parties «" io

20.

The

court

ha

extent, generally ^nd
^he household

contents

court

finds

that

her

assets.

; computation of the division of

tor

Itoarket value and equic

wul» the

/i.ie of $20,000.00, which is the value

retirement has a curre
the court is using

flt-jwi'^y. " ' " ^ rh* -iwc -f rha

:;r,- fc has spent a considerable Amount of

Euii—p^^f.

IIIIU..IIJU

^acher with Granite School District.

. -^ -.red.

^hc time thry aotlcr;^^;

Llig'j'J

and 454 retirement accounts through

:•-. FxeefelC of $60,000.00 at approximately-,

These accounts had a--vr--i

-gcmmencQmenc of chi-a—ae

.as been paid for in full.

own an old house trailer with a fair

of $1,500.00.
received evidence

as

to the nature and

tr some specifics, as to various items of
The court finds that the fair value of

those contents, eepara-. CMIC apart from the personal effects of the
parties,

is

$20,CC0.0

statement of value c:
21. Mr. Menz nar.
employers, Boart
$137,200.00.
monthly

-.- -rmpany.

t3r

;.;:i2

withdraw additional fi.

the petitioner's

retirement account with one of his former

: xed

to h:n ee

finds that

.: 00 understates the value.

This i

income

withholding

Long

T:,e court

The value of the account is

account
of

which

$1,632,00,

rr-c .-th of $1,232.00.

generates
and

a

a gross

net

after

He is not able to

" from the account, but has a fixed monthly

income from the ?.ccc:
h\:

- account with a value of $317,000.00.

23 . Mrs. Men:' \>\

.A account with a value of $100,000.00.

22. Mr. Menz

WN(Yi AT lAW
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Mir

: ^regoing assets, except for the joint

24. The valL- :f

is $954,700.00

Fidelity Invests : 25. Since

• mds

t .<

that

the Fidelity

Investments

account has been ^ e :

• and that the inheritance investments

have lost their $ c r

*-:tity, the court finds a value of the

$145,000 .00 with

Menz, plus $116,000.00 withdrawn by

Mrs. Menz, and t ^

at the date set by the court of the

Remaining $116,0C
J

.0

total of $377,000.00.

26 . Adding t.v is

3 prior asset subtotal the court finds

•i

total assets of ~:,.>3
5- -di Lhe nature of the wrongs rnmmir.iLSd
?4>y each uf Lllfc pal t1"r

-v j3g the other in the mariijyu thai luwe

•contributed to tn re T

rrt ^r aic mutual;—and LhaL each party-gan

point fiiujms at : rr —

er

r: oxdez LO lay blaww.

£-£

uG of blame arc cuch that fault should

~

—in diotributing—the—assets

nd that ths ii: x
be—taken—into—e-c *.-e it

1

of—she

mailLai estate.
2 8. The cou ' h

:i

finds that a division of one-half to

each party of th> i,_

tc

: is appropriate, and that each party

should be awardec p o

'_>

. th a value of $665,850.00.

29. During

er

daughters of the

r .•

Wild Clover Lane

: ;>

funds were used v* \

»fM/«.ANOO«tVf
»JflU

The—crotrrt—does

a home was purchased for one of the
zh property shall be designated as the
ituated in Salt Lake County.
r,i

Joint

il consent of the parties for the down

payment on the * , \c

iughter and her husband had invested

time and labor i:

ruction of the home and the money was

used co purchase the home so that the equity derived from their
labors would not be lost

Due to the fact that the daughter and

her husband could not qualify for a loan, the heme was purchased in
the name or Mr. M e m .
the

monthly

The daughter and her husband have since paid

payments,

except

for

an

arrearage

to

date

of

approximately $1,700.00 which Mr. Menz has had to pay, and they
have maintained the home as their own.
30. The court finds that the home was purchased by mutual
agreement and consent of the parties for the benefit of the one
•daughter and her husband with no intent that the home be the
separate property of either of the parties. The

title to the

property is being held in what amounts to a constructive trust for
the benefit

of the daughter and husband who occupy

the home.

Therefore, the value of that home will not be included as an asset
of the marital estate.
31. The major assets of the parties are listed below, and the
values attached thereto the court finds are fair and reasonable
values.

To divide the marital estate in order to award values as

set forth in paragraph 28 above, it is fair, just and reasonable
that the petitioner, Gail Menz, should be awarded the following
assets

a. The household contents:

$20,000.00

b. Mrs. Menz's IRA account:

$100,000.00

c. Mrs. Menz's retirement:

$20,000.00

d

The withdrawals by Mrs.
Menz from the joint Fidelity

S M ( AW
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account of $116,000 and
$145,000:

$261,000.00

e. The family residence at 4532
Crest Oak Circle, with an
equity value of $313,000.00,
less an equitable lien due
Mr. Menz of tt6 -±5$ -&£:
Value-

$246,850.00

r. GMC vehicle:

$18,000,00

TOTAL TO MRS. MENZ:

$665,850.00

32. Mr. Menz is entitled to the remaining property listed by
'the court above as follows:
a. Equitable lien in home:

$*G, 150.00

b. Mr. Menz's pickup truck:

$28,000.00

c. The old house trailer:

$1,500.00

d. Mr. Menz's Longyear
retirement:

$137,200.00

e. Mr. Menz'6 IRA account:

$317,000.00

f. Balance left in joint
Fidelity Investments acct:
TOTAL TO MR. MENZ:
33.

With

regard

.
to

the

equitable

$116,000.00
$665,850.00
lien,

that

amount

of

-rsfc: srs^ £JO should be paid by Gail Menz to William Menz within five
(5) years

from

the date of the Decree

of Divorce, either by

refinancing the property, selling the property, or by Mrs. Menz
drawing upon other assets to pay the amount due.

HANODflVf
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34. Each party should be awarded their personal effects, their
separate banking accounts, and any other items of personal property
presently in their respective possessions, ail free and clear of
any claim by the other party.
35. Mr. Menz should immediately convey by quit claim deed the
wild Clover Lane property to his daughter and her husband who
occupy the home.
For some months prior to the time the parties separated ac
the end olsi998, Mrs. Menz, without the knowledge or consent of Mr.
Menz incurredSubstantial credit card debts, and at the time of
separation those d^lsits totalled approximately $46,000.00.
37. ^rhe items purchased, and which constitute

the entire

aforesaid amount, were all for married, adult daughters.

Many of

the^items are extravagant and lavish,
i^K

Mrs. Men2 has paid down the above balance since the

parties sep^ated, but has not disclosed the balance.

It is fair,

just and reasoi^ble that each party should pay one-half of the
1

present, remaining balance due for the items purchased by credit
jcard which constitute th^ above balance.

The debts should be

divided and the amounts due £*iould be paid directly to the credit
'card companies and not by one p^txy paying money to the other.
while many of the purchases were of a*v excessive and extravagant
nature on the part of Mrs. Menz, an awarcKto require Mr. Menz to
pay half of those debts is taken into consideration by this court
in dividing the other property and debts in this c^se
At the time the parties separated
10
noe
2:*

*<oc

there was a second

morbgage on the home which was apparently used for various family
purposes .\ The court finds that Mrs. Menz added to the debc after
the separation and then paid for the debt using ]cinc monies
*"<r&>-J3rs. Menz having used joint funds to pay for the home
equity debt, th€ obligation should be deemed to have been paid by
both parties and no^particular credit should be awarded to either
party.
41. Gail Mentis 60 years of age, teaches school full time for
Granite School District, Imd^currently earns $43,000.00 per year,
plus she receives various insurance^md^retirement benefits through
that employment.
42 7T?Frr--Meiizis contemplating hip surgery during the summer
of 2000 on both hips simuTE^meQUSly.

At the present time it is

icult for her to continue workingwi<4iOUt the surgery.
43. TheTi^48 some reasonable likelihood that she will be able
to return to work aft>x^her surgery, although how much time she can
:e to her employment is^nqt known.
44. WilTriam Menz is 57 years ot^age, and was employed by Boart
Longyear Company for^m^ny years selling mining equipment.

In his

last years with the company^i^ earned approximately $4,100.00 per
month gross income.
^n about 1996 or 1997 Mr. Menz encountered problems with
Boart

Longyear ^rsqcerning the future of his position due to a

decline in the mining industry worldwide, and a resulting decrease
the need for mining equipmfei^. and supplies.

His sales had

dropped off and he inquired about rehiring from the company.
V
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He

was offered alternative employment in the warehouse at an hourly
rat- between $7.00 and">a^po per hour.

Ke declined this offer and

took an early retirement from Boa^t Longyear and began collecting
his retirement as well as 13 months ofs^pAration pay that was part
cf the early^B^iremenc package offered to Mr.
46. Shortly the^^fter he went to work for another company,
the Hoffman Company, that markets mining equipment and supplies,
and worked for them Cor about on^rear at a salary comparable to
that of Bcart Longyear.

However, aftels^the year period the same

market conditions affecting the mining indusfc*^caused the Hoffman
>any to lay off Mr. Menz.
47>Mr. Menz has some slight hearing impairment, he has high
•blood pressurer^ncj is in his late 50's.

He testified that he had

|tnade some efforts to fina^employment in his same line of employment
&nd experience but was unabl^to do so, that his age seemed a
factor limiting his employment

opjx^rtunities, and he therefore

ceased looking for such employment.
.The court finds that it would not be fair or equitable to
require Mr. Meits^to look for minimum wage or low paying employment
under the circumstanc&s^cited above, particularly when his Boart
Longyear retirement income f&vii monthly gross of $1,632.00.
49. Under these circumstances the court does not find chat Mr.
lenz^ is intentionally underemployed.
50. GaUr^JJenz testified that she has monthly expenses of
$4,231.00.

Part of the^-^xP e n s e s

ar

^ d u G to the fact that she has

a married daughter and her fanul^^iving with her at petitioner's
* A M I ( V I'C .
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acquiescence.

That daughter has at times in the past paid monies

towards t*i^ household expenses, and assists with tasks around the
home.

Mrs. Me^v? also testified that she enjoys giving gifts and

entertaining her family at her home, which adds to her monthly
costs,

in addition, t h e ^ i d expense total includes $1,000.00 per

month towards

the aforementioned credit card debt which will now

be halved due to Mr, Menz being required to pay one-half of that
debt .
^

^Mr. Menr has monthly expenses of $2,875.00. That amount

may increase "due to the requirement that he pay one-half of the
credit card debt,

T4*\ Menz is also assisting with back payments

for the daughter living rn^the Wild Clover Lane property, although
he expects her to repay him. X^she defaults he may be responsible
for the balance due on the loan.
52 . Both^p^rties reap income from their investment accounts
that at times appear^to be considerable.
I

53. in 1998, the year the parties separated, each of them

.filed separatelriQome tax returns.

Gail Menz had a gross adjusted

•income for that year CHL $69, 745 . 00 .

William Menz had a gross

'adjusted income of $54,024.0fr>
54. The court finds that each of the parties has received what
essentially

amounts

to one-half

of the primary

assets of the

parries, and each thus has a substantial measure of assets.

Both

have limited abilities to work that are roughly equivalent, and
each

receives

earnings

from

their

retirement funds.

13

investment

accounts

and

55. Because of the factors set forth above the court does not
find that alimony should be awarded to either party, each being
able to support themselves at a comparable standard of living.
Neither party has the ability to support the other beyond their own
capabilities .
56. The court also does not find that the nature of fault
causing the failure of the marriage is such that the grounds for
Jthe divorce should be taken into consideration in awarding alimony,
it appearing to the court that both parties are to blame to some
degree for the failure of the marriage.
57. The only testimony during trial regarding attorney's fees
was the mention by Mrs. Menz of an amount in the neighborhood of
$30,000.00.

There was no other evidence presented prior to the

time the parties rested their cases.
58. Also due to the nature and extent of financial resources,
the division of debts, and the described relatively equal abilities
of the parties to meet their respective obligations, the court
tinds that each party should pay their own costs and attorney's
•fees incurred in this action.
59. Commissioner Thomas Arnett made a recommendation during
the early stages of the proceedings in this case that allowed Mrs.
Menz to take from the joint Fidelity account up to $1000.00 per
month to meet her needs. This was not a flat amount she was granted
by the Commissioner'8 own clarification minute entry.

During that

time Mr. Menz paid Mrs. Menz $500.00 per month towards the amount
she claimed she needed.
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Due to this fact, and the division of the
14

debts and assets above described, Mrs. Menz is not entitled cc any
claim against Mr. Menz for an arrearage amount.
60. A temporary restraining order was entered freezing certain
accounts of Mr. Menz.

That order was released as to his Bear:

Longyear retirement account, but substituted another account. That
restraining order should be vacated immediately in its entirety and
any monies being held as back payments

from Mr. Menz's Boart

Longyear monthly pension account should be paid to him forthwith.
61. Any other debts incurred by the parties should be paid by
the party that incurred the debt, and each should hold the other
harmless from any such debts and obligations.
62. Each should be required to pay any obligations connected
with any property awarded to them under the terms of the Decree of
Divorce, including, but not limited, to the requirement that Gail
Menz pay the monthly payments on the family residence to be awarded
to her.
63. Each party should hold the other harmless from the debts
each is required to pay.

Each should notify their respective

creditors of their obligations for debts under the terms of the
Decree of Divorce to be entered by this court.
FROM

THE

FOREGOING,

the

court

now

makes

and

enters the

a Decree

of Divorce

following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The

petitioner

shall be granted

dissolving the marriage of the parties, the same to become absolute
and final upon entry.
A| i M, VVA (|AK(
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2. The relief more fully described above is a fair, just and
reasonable division, and the parties shall therefore be awarded the
relief as described in the Findings of Pact hereinabove in the
Decree of Divorce to be entered by this court.
3.

The

temporary

restraining

order

shall

be

vacated

immediately and any funds due Mr. Menz from his Boart Longyear
retirement that were withheld previously shall be paid at once to
him.
DATED this

day of Jtas£, 2000.

BY THE COURT:

District Judge

Approved as to Form;

SUZANNE WEST
Attorney for Petitioner
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GREGORY B. WALL (3365)
WALL & WALL
Attorneys for Respondent
5200 S. Highland Dr., Suite 300
Sale Lake City, Utah 84117
801-274-3100
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

GAIL PATRICIA MENZ,
)

DECREE OF DIVORCE

Petitioner
)

v.
)

Civil No. 984906014

)

Judge William A. Thome

.WILLIAM JEFFREY MENZ,
Respondent

«

)

Comm. Thomas N. Arnett -

The above captioned matter came on for trial before the court
Bitting without a jury on February 22 and February 23, 2000, the
Honorable

William A. Thorne, district

judge,

presiding.

The

jpetitioner is Gail Patricia Menz, who was present and represented
.by her attorney, Suzanne West. The respondent is William Jeffrey
Menz, who was present and represented by his attorney, Gregory B.
wall
Each party was sworn and testified as to the issues in this
case.

Other witnesses were also called, sworn and testified on

behalf of the parties.

Various exhibits were also offered by each

party and received by the court into evidence.

The court has

jurisdiction over the issues and the parties in this proceeding.
Venue is proper in this county.
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Closing arguments were held on April 28, 2000

Each of the

parties was personally present and represented by their respective
attorneys. Based upon the foregoing, the court being fully advised
m

the premises and the law, and the court having heretofore made

and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the court
does herewith ORDER, ADJUDGE AND DECREE AS FOLLOWS
1. The petitioner is granted a Decree of Divorce dissolving
the marriage of the parties, the same co become absolute and final
upon entry.
2. The petitioner is awarded all right, title, interest and
estate the parties may have in the real property situated at 4532
Crest Oak Circle, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, which property
'is more particularly described as follows:
All of Lot 903, Mt. Olympus Hills No. 9 Subdivision
according to the official plat thereof as recorded
in the office of the Salt Lake County Recorder.
Parcel No. 22-01-308-025
3. The petitioner is granted the sole and exclusive right to
the use and occupancy of the said real property.
pay

the monthly

connected

with

mortgage

payments

the property

and other

as they

accrue

She is ordered to
taxes

and fees

and to hold the

respondent harmless therefrom.
4. The above interest of the petitioner

is subject to an

equitable lien in the name of William Jeffrey Menz, the respondent,
in the amount of $66,150.00.

This amount

shall be payable by

petitioner to respondent no later than five (5) years from the date
of the entry of this Decree of Divorce.
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If the property must be

sold or refinanced to pay the lien then that shall be done
5. Neither party is awarded any alimony.
6. Gail Menz is awarded the 1998 GMC Jimmy automobile free and
clear of any claim by the respondent.
7. Gail Menz is awarded the contents of the home at 4532 Crest
Oak Circle, free and clear of any claim by respondent
8. Petitioner is also awarded her IRA account, her retirement
accounts,

her

Fidelity

Investments

account,

and

any

monies

withdrawn previously from the joint Fidelity Investments account,
all free and clear of any claim by the respondent.
9. The respondent William Menz is awarded his 1999 pickup
truck,

the

old

house

trailer,

his

Boart

Longyear

retirement

account, his IRA account, and the balance that was left in the
Fidelity Investments account, all free and clear of any claim by
the petitioner.
10.

Each

party

is awarded

the

said

funds

and

accounts

including any changes in the nature or location of the funds from
such accounts, as well as any increases in the accounts or funds to
which each is entitled.

Some of the monies acquired by the parties

have been reinvested with different investment firms, or placed in
different accounts, but they are traceable to the original assets
awarded herein, and it is the intention of the court that those
assets derived or traceable from the original accounts go to the
party who is awarded the asset as set forth above.
11.

Each party

is awarded

their personal

effects, their

separate banking accounts, and any other items of personal property
l 1 WAU | A l (
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presently in their respective possessions all free and clear of any
claim by the other party.
12. The respondent is ordered to immediately convey by quiz
claim deed the real property known as the Wild Clover Lane property
tc the daughter and husband who occupy that property and who claim
the property to be theirs.
with

that

property

shall

Any debt payment problems connected
be

resolved

by

respondent

with his

daughter and her husband, and he is ordered to hold the petitioner
harmless therefrom.
13. Each party shall pay one-half of the prr rVnfnfH-fmcp owrng-4*H; the credit card debts that were incurred by Mrs . Menz prior co
the separation of the parties and which were 6et forth in her
testimony and evidence to the court.

The court directs that the

accounts be divided and each pay the monies owing directly to the
creditors* and—that—thox*—n&t—be—monies—pvrh^ng^ri

be^w^en—the

parties—Cos—s-he—payment—ef—the—s«ti£—eredxt—card—dtebt-s—unlock
absolutely necessary-to equalize tho^accountg division.
14.

Petitioner

is granted

no credit

or judgment

against

respondent for her payment of the second mortgage on the family
residence.
15. Each party is ordered to pay any debts and obligations
incurred by them since their separation in December, 1998, as well
as any other debts incurred by each party not specifically set
forth herein, and to hold the other party harmless therefrom.
16.

Each

party

is

ordered

to

pay

attorney's fees incurred in this action.
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their

own

coses and

17. No arrearage amount is due by respondent to petitioner as
a result of the temporary support order previously granted by this
court.
18.
vacated

The

temporary

restraining

order

in

effect

is hereby

in its entirety, as to all property of the respondent

'William J. Mens, and effective immediately.

Respondent William J

Jfienz is granted any unpaid monthly pension amounts due him from his
i'

IBoart Longyear pension account.
!

i

19. Each party is ordered to pay any debts connected with any

ji

.property awarded to them under the terms of this Decree of Divorce,
and to hold the other party harmless therefrom.
j,

20. Each party is ordered to notify their respective creditors

|as to the debts each is ordered to pay under the terms of this
ji

jpecree of Divorce.
21. Each party is ordered to pay their own medical and dental
;bills that may now exist, or that may be incurred in the future,
Jand to hold the other party harmless therefrom.
22.

The

parties

are

mutually

restrained

from

harming,

threatening, bothering, stalking, harassing, or intimidating the
other party at any time or location.
DATED this
day of Jane, 2000.
BY THE COURT:

t-fTTiTiTTiM TI

Tunrmn

District Judge
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Approved as to form:

SUZANNE WEST
Attorney for Petitioner

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING AND NOTICE OF INTENTION TO SUBMIT
This is to certify that a true and correct copy and an
original of the foregoing Decree of Divorce was mailed, postage
prepaid, to Suzanne West, attorney fofi.^aetitioner, 207 Neyman
Street, Salmon, Idaho, 83467, on the / ^ v d a y of June, 2000,
Notice is also given to the petitioner and her attorney that
if the above Decree of Divorce is not approved as to form and
Returned to the office of respondent's counsel by Tuesday, June 13,
submitted to the court for the
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